Keynote speech Opening Ceremony of the CTBT Science & Technology Conference Heinz Fischer 24 June 2019, ViennaExcellencies, Distinguished delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour and a privilege to be with you here today for this important science and technology forum. My friend and colleague Ban Ki-moon regrets very much that he cannot be here today. Sad personal circumstances prevented him to come to Vienna and to speak at today’s Opening Ceremony of the Science and Technology Conference of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation. Ban Ki-moon asked me to be here in his stead, and speak to you about the important role, the CTBTO continues to play for a peaceful and secure cohabitation of this planet. He served as the CTBTO’s Chairman of its Preparatory Commission back in 1999. This shows, that this organisation has been dear to him since the initial years of its existence. The basis of this keynote speech is the manuscript of Ban Ki-moon, transformed in my language with some personal observations from my side and shortened to a certain extent. The CTBTO remains a shining example of how science and technology can help contribute to positive political and diplomatic outcomes. The Treaty has had a significant positive impact since it was adopted in 1996. With the notable exception of North Korea, the CTBT has achieved de facto implementation despite not having entered into force, with no other nuclear state having carried out a nuclear test since 1998. And despite the lack of entry into force, the CTBT and CTBTO have made important contributions in making it easier to detect nuclear tests, and in establishing a strong normative taboo against states carrying out nuclear tests. This has made a notable contribution to protecting the world from the deeply harmful environmental and health impacts of nuclear testing, and is an important step on the path towards total disarmament. All this has been possible because of the hard work and commitment of a group of scientists and technology experts who nearly thirty years ago undertook intensive, complex and sensitive groundwork to pave the way for a deal. Their efforts made it easier for the diplomats to negotiate the final text, because there was already a scientific and technological consensus on the parameters. Therefore, all of us express our admiration and gratitude for all that this organisation has done over the decades to support nuclear non-proliferation and the true cause of peace. But I fear it is a bittersweet moment, because there is today an acute risk that rash and hubristic policy shifts could undo all the valuable work the CTBTO and others have achieved, bringing us closer to the brink of a devastating nuclear war than any time since the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. We currently find ourselves at one of the most dangerous times for arms control efforts for many decades. The bilateral arms control architecture developed between the US and the Soviet Union towards the end of the Cold War is being rapidly unravelled, through a combination of neglect, hubris and erroneous threat analysis. The risk of a catastrophic nuclear event, whether by accident or design, is increased by the paralysis in international bodies charged with upholding peace and security, most notably the United Nations Security Council. Ban Ki-moon had the honour of addressing the Council earlier this month in New York as a member of The Elders, the group of independent leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights. Together with Mary Robinson, he spoke frankly to the Council and particularly its five permanent members – all nuclear-armed states – to remind them of their uniquely heavy responsibility to develop effective processes of non-proliferation and disarmament. But there are only few signs of the P5 and other states with nuclear weapons capabilities showing willing to meet these, as national and international politics appears increasingly driven by polarisation, isolationism and an alarming disdain for the very principles of multilateralism. The imminent expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in August is the most significant blow, with the potential to threaten the stability not only of Europe, but also much of Asia, if it leads to a renewed arms race involving the US, China, India and Pakistan. The decision of US President Donal Trump to withdraw from the INF is symptomatic of a much broader negative context of unilateral moves and repudiation of previous agreements. Consider the possible collapse of the JCPOA – an agreement negotiated so painstakingly here in Vienna, and which was universally deemed to be working well before the American decision, with all the implications we see now for rising tensions between Iran and the United States and wider Middle East security. Consider as well the recent US withdrawal from the Arms Trade Treaty, and growing concern as to whether the New START treaty between the US and Russia will be extended beyond February 2021. The world needs to wake up to the severity of the current threat, and the nuclear states must get serious about taking steps towards disarmament to avert an incalculable catastrophe. Nuclear weapons constitute an existential threat to the future of humanity, just as much as climate change. And just as science plays an indispensable role in the fight against climate change, so it must now be mobilised in the service of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This includes exact and dispassionate analysis of new technological developments that risk complicating and destabilising traditional practices of arms control and disarmament, including artificial intelligence, cyber-technology and space-based delivery and tracking systems. In the longer term, total disarmament is likely to require the multilateral agreement of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This may seem a remote prospect today.But, in order for such a convention to be a realistic possibility in the future, there is an important need for substantial work to be done now to find technological solutions that can enable total disarmament to take place with confidence that effective verification and enforcement mechanisms are in place. All of us need to treat these issues with the utmost seriousness and urgency. This is why The Elders have launched a new initiative on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which was presented by Mary Robinson and Lakhdar Brahimi to the Munich Security Conference this February. They are calling on the nuclear powers to pursue a “minimisation agenda” that could help to reduce the nuclear threat and make concrete progress towards disarmament. Nuclear states should and must make progress in four areas:
- doctrine – all states making a “no first use” declaration;
- de-alerting – taking almost all nuclear weapons off high alert status;
- deployment – dramatically reducing the numbers of weapons actively deployed;
- and decreased numbers – for Russia and the US to adopt deep cuts in warhead numbers to around 500 each, with no increase in warheads by other states.